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INTOLERABLE BUT MORAL?
THINKING ABOUT HELL
Paul T. Jensen

Thomas Talbott's recent argument for Hell's nonexistence is a sophisticated
version of hard universalism. I suggest some reasons to question his argument
and to accept the logical and moral possibility that some humans will not be
saved.
If Hell does not exist, those who think it does are merely foolish; if it does

exist, those who think it doesn't may be in great danger. Only if Hell exists
can one end up there; but if it does not, no one can end up there even if they
believe they can. A recent national survey indicates that 60% of all Americans,
66% of all Protestants, and 57% of all Catholics believe in Hell.' Are these people
foolishly deceived? Thomas Talbott believes they are. I think he is wrong.
A garden variety argument for universalism may be put in the following
way. There are two biblical ways of looking at salvation. One claims that
only Christian believers will be saved; the other claims that all human persons
will be saved. 2 The latter is more loving and hence must be true because God
is love. 3 Talbott recently presented a sophisticated version of this argument.
In sum, he asserted that (using his numbering system):
(3) God loves every created person
and
(5)

God will finally reject some persons and subject those persons to everlasting punishment

are inconsistent. Furthermore, that
(3') God loves some created persons but not all
is necessarily false. And the kind of choice described in
(5') Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, finally reject
God and separate themselves from God forever
is incoherent. And, even if it were coherent, it would be the type of evil "a
loving God would be required to prevent."4 Talbott's argument rests on the
assertion that God loves every created person and attempts to demonstrate
the further claim that God's love entails universalism.
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Before investigating these claims it might be well to point out that Talbott's
conclusion seems to qualify as 'hard universalism,' the view that no person
can be finally lost, as opposed to 'soft universalism,' the view that no person
will be finally lost. 5 Any view claiming that the salvation of all humans
follows from the necessary attributes of God would qualify as hard universalism. Any view claiming that the damnation of some humans is logically
and morally possible, but will never be actual, would qualify as soft universalism. Talbott's argument amounts to the claim that God's essential attribute·
of love renders it impossible that any person will be finally lost. How should
this argument be assessed?
That God loves every created person is probably more widely held than
any assumption about God. But even widely held assumptions require some
justification. How would one go about justifying this claim? Might it be a
truth of reason? To my knowledge no ontological argument exists to prove
that God possesses essentially the attribute of love. Can it be derived from
experience? The preponderance of evidence seems to stand on the negative
side. Though many people experience unmistakable and even extraordinary
instances of God's providence, which they interpret as evidence of God's love
for them, they also weather considerable grief and pain, and witness more in
others. This leads me to conclude that insufficient experiential evidence exists
for justifying the claim that God loves all his creatures.
Thus, if such a belief is true, only God's special revelation of it could be
a sufficient justification for believing it. 6 And here the difficulty emerges, for
the biblical theist finds intertwined with the assertions of God's love, God's
condemnation of unbelievers and the assertion that they will perish. The most
famous, of course, are the familiar verses found in John 3:16-19.
If one cannot know the truth of (3) apart from special divine revelation, it
seems unlikely that one can discover the nature of God's love for his creatures
apart from that revelation as well. If that is so, pronouncements about the
composition of divine love demand a number of prior theological commitments, among which are the following: there is a special divine revelation;
it is the only source for certain central Christian beliefs; and it stands as a
control over those beliefs. Lest I be accused here of theological pedantry, I
would urge that calling attention to these affirmations seems imperative in
light of Talbott's claim that his conclusions regarding Hell represent biblical
theism. 7 If one wants to remain open to persuasion of Hell's nonexistence, as
I do, it is well to be reminded of these; for, in the end, one may need to choose
between faithfulness to a specially revealed truth and acquiescence to forceful
and appealing arguments against it.
Along side the biblical affirmations of God's love are other more disturbing
assertions of which the following are a sample:
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You are not a God who takes pleasure in evil; with you the wicked cannot
dwell. The arrogant cannot stand in your presence; you hate all who do
wrong. (Ps. 5:5)
The Lord examines the righteous, but the wicked and those who love violence
his soul hates. (Ps. 11:5-6) [Cpo Provo 6:16-19; In. 3:36; Rom. 1:18; Eph.
2:1-3]

These texts, and many others, serve as a sober reminder that the Hebrew
mind affirmed that God hates wrongdoers and acts in wrath against human
wickedness. These texts can be dismissed as revealing nothing true about
God, or they can be treated as equal in weight to the texts asserting God's
universal love. The former tack leaves nothing to be discussed, but those who
follow it must surrender the title "biblical theist." The latter tack requires
harmonizing the dual affirmations of divine love and wrath; it means asserting
in some coherent way that humans are simultaneously objects of God's love
and God's wrath. Can this be done? I believe it can.
Calvin-bashing has become something of a cottage industry lately, and
Augustine's unpopularity lags not far behind Calvin's. I haven't the space to
defend them as faithful interpreters of the Hebrew scriptures or of St. John
and St. Paul, but both offered a coherent and exegetically sound harmony of
this paradox. The term "hate" used in the Hebrew scriptures presents the
greatest difficulty.8 If it means detesting and intending to destroy, it seems
impossible to hate and love the same object. But there is a way out of this
dilemma: God may simultaneously hate and love the same individual by
hating one aspect of that individual and loving another.
Augustine explained that God simultaneously hates and loves us because
he knows how to hate us "for what we were that he had not made [viz.
sin] ... and to love what he had made."9 Calvin stated similarly that "God,
apart from Christ is always angry with us," although he "does not hate in us
His own workmanship, that is, the fact that he has created us as living beings,
but He hates our uncleanness, which has extinguished the light of His image."10 Neither Augustine nor Calvin can be construed as believing God
actually hates individuals if by that is meant that he hates what he has created.
God's wrath against sin means he desires and intends to destroy it. It seems
reasonable to hold that though God loves all created individuals, those who by
their wicked choices destroy his workmanship and image fall under his wrath.
The issue then comes to this: can persons so distort and corrupt God's image
as to be only worthy of his wrath/hatred; or can they so defile and pervert
the divine creation as to destroy their status as beings loved by God? The
Hebrew scriptures, the words of Jesus as recorded in the New Testament, and
the writings of St. John and St. Paul strongly imply that it is. My major point
here is not to prove that Hell exists, but only to demonstrate that (3) and (5)
are not inconsistent and that while (3') may be false, (5') is not incoherent.
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It is one thing to say God loves sinners, quite another to say God loves
evil. What separates universalists and those who believe in Hell's existence
is not whether God loves all created individuals, but the analysis of what
divine love means. If "God loves me" means that God must necessarily save
me, then of course God cannot be said to love me unless he saves me. But I
can find no scriptural warrant for this as the meaning of divine love. The New
Testament presentation of divine love includes two assertions: (i) that God
gave his one and only Son so that those who believe will not perish (In. 3: 16),
and (ii) that while we were still sinners Christ died for us (Rom. 5:8). So far
as I can see, neither of these explanations of the meaning of divine love entails
uni versalism.
The question turns on whether human individuals can become evil by their
own choices and actions and there seems abundant evidence to affirm that
they can. ll Karl Barth, whose enigmatic stance on universalism is well
known, asserted at the end of his Church Dogmatics that "To the man who
persistently tries to change the truth into untruth, God does not owe eternal
patience and therefore deliverance."12 A view of God's love that construes it
as the Ananke which robs the divine will of the freedom to deal with humans
in mercy or justice seems to my mind biblically misinformed and logically
suspect.
The New Testament presents human salvation as the product of divine
grace. Salvation implies deliverance from an unpleasant consequence; grace
implies ill-dessert. Is it the case that I do not deserve salvation? Unless it is,
I am not saved by grace. The universalist must assert either (i) that all humans
deserve salvation, or (ii) that all humans will avail themselves of the means
of grace (soft universalism), or (iii) that God's love necessitates that all be
saved despite their ill-dessert (hard universalism). The difficulty with hard
universalism is that genuine human ill-dessert requires salvation to be the
product of divine supererogatory goodness. But the very notion of supererogatory goodness, i.e., good acts which God can justly leave undone, makes
the claim that God is required to perform them incoherent. Thus, if humans
are ill-deserving of divine salvation, God can justly not save them. Talbott
does not deny this, but his argument implies that divine love vitiates divine
freedom: God's love necessitates that God perform supererogatorily good
acts. I find this unintelligible.
The perfect love of Father, Son, and Spirit within the divine Trinity cannot
be added to or subtracted from by virtue of God's relations to his creatures,
nor can God's love be perfected only through creation and redemptionY
Thus, it cannot be argued that God's love is greater or fuller in the salvation
of all individuals. But Talbott holds that:
In the case of an omnipotent and omniscient being ... the claim that such a
being loves a person for awhile and then ceases to love that person makes
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no sense at all. Suppose that for fifty years God were to act towards Smith
in exactly the way he would act towards someone he loves, and suppose that
God were to do so in the full knowledge that forever afterwards he would
act towards Smith in unloving ways. Could we then say that God loved Smith
for awhile?-that for awhile he intended to promote the best interest of
Smith? Surely not. In the case of God, it surely is a necessary truth that God
loves a person at one time (in the New Testament sense of agape love) only
if he loves that person at all subsequent times. 14

But this does not seem to be a necessary truth at all. I believe it misconstrues the nature of divine love by failing to take account of divine wrath and
human responsibility. Humans are mutable; God's love and wrath are constant. Which one I place myself under depends on the free choices I make.
As a sinful individual I am simultaneously under both divine love and wrath.
The issue is whether I can destroy what God loves. Can I willfully render
myself solely an object of divine wrath? Talbott believes I cannot. The frightful truth about myself, however, is that when I contemplate my own being I
find numerous reasons to think I can. Perhaps I should not have been given
such power, but then, perhaps there are mysteries too deep for human reason
to penetrate. If I willfully destroy what God loves, I cannot hold that God
continues to love me unless I am prepared to subscribe to the blasphemous
notion that God loves evil and wickedness. I, at least, am unwilling to endorse
such a judgment.
Peter Geach opined that "People say rather lightly that they could not bear
for a damned soul to be punished unendingly; but someone confronted with
the damned would find it impossible to wish that things so evil should be
happy-particularly when the misery is seen as the direct and natural consequence of the gUilt."15 Talbott objects to this on the grounds that if he loves
his daughter as he loves himself, her damnation would be an intolerable loss
to him and would undermine the possibility of his own happiness. Furthermore, he argues that, from the premise that he could not wish to see his
daughter both morally corrupt and happy, it does not follow that he would
not wish to see her happy, for if his daughter should become as corrupt and
miserable as Geach describes, that would increase his sense of loss and his
desire to see her both redeemed and happy.16
It would be foolish and uncharitable to suggest that Talbott's feelings respecting his daughter are mistaken. Indeed, as a parent I am strongly inclined
to agree with him. But my belief that humans can make themselves evil causes
me to hesitate. So as not to offend Talbott unnecessarily, let me use my own
son as the example. Let us suppose that, as I earnestly pray will never happen,
my son were to destroy the image of God in himself and willfully place
himself under the divine wrath by becoming wicked. Precisely who is it that
I would desire to see both redeemed and happy? The son who once was, or
the son who now is? Do not many parents tragically, but rightly, say to a
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child, I love what you used to be, but hate what you have made of yourself?
To hate wickedness and intensely desire that it be destroyed is not unloving
and in no way vitiates the reality of one's love for a person who once was,
but is no more.
This carries implications for the love of enemies as well. According to
Talbott, "if supremely worthwhile happiness requires that I learn to love my
enemies even as I love my own daughter, then the damnation of [a] single
person is incompatible with such happiness in me."17 But surely the command
to love our enemies is not a command to love their wickedness. We are
commanded to love them because we are utterly ignorant of the state of their
souls. Performing vicious and wicked acts does not mean ipso facto that they
have destroyed God's image in themselves. (Has any recipient of God's gracious redemption not performed such acts?) God requires Christians to act in
kind and generous ways toward their enemies precisely because we are ignorant of our enemies' motives, desires, and intentions. God does not lack such
knowledge; he who knows every aspect of every mind acts towards individuals in love or wrath depending on the motives, desires, intentions, and choices
of the individuals in question. When or if I become privy to this same knowledge I will presumably think as God does. I see no reason to suppose one
cannot be supremely happy while hating wickedness. On the contrary, it
seems incredible to me that anyone could be supremely happy who did not
hate wickedness and earnestly desire its destruction. Thus, the possibility of
the damnation of sinners is not removed by arguing that God's love requires
him to prevent each person from "undermining the possibility of supremely
worthwhile happiness in others."18 If I am damned it is because I have made
myself wicked and thereby destroyed God's image in me. Unless supremely
worthwhile happiness entails loving wickedness, no one's damnation can
destroy supreme happiness in others.
I suspect many, like me, find the possibility of Hell intolerable but moralintolerable, not because some people suffer the consequences of their sinful
actions, but because it is intolerable for humans to act as wickedly as they
do. Perhaps Talbott is right; perhaps an omnipotent and perfectly loving God
would never permit sinners to place themselves under his wrath. If so, those
who believe Hell exists are merely foolish. If not, it is exceedingly dangerous
for me to believe that Hell does not exist. Since I have yet to find a reason
to think God's love forces him to perform supererogatorily good acts, I am
inclined to agree with Eleonore Stump who suggests that Hell may serve to
protect the righteous from the wicked. 19 Pray God it does not serve to protect
the righteous from me.
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